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The date is July 17, 1996.  Emergency services personnel from Suffolk County, NY and 
the United States Coast Guard respond to a report of a catastrophic explosion and the 
crash of a passenger airliner over the ocean off the southern coast of Long Island. The 
initial assumption is a nexus to terrorism. The East Moriches Coast Guard Station is 
designated as the operations command post, staging area, and evidence collection point. 
As the incident shifts from response to recovery, personnel from various response 
disciplines and levels of government stream into the station.  Among them is Lieutenant 
Colonel David Williams of the U.S. Army Reserve. LTC Williams, dressed in his U.S. 
Army Reserve flight suit, presents identification, enters the site, and assists in the 
operation by landing helicopters on the designated helipads. On the third day of his 
work, LTC Williams is questioned concerning his identity and affiliation. Following a 
brief investigation, LTC Williams is identified as an impostor, escorted from the 
property, and charged by the Suffolk County Police.1 
Identity is defined as the “the collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a 
thing is definitively recognizable or known.”2 In the incident described above, the set of 
characteristics that assumed an identity consisted of a uniform, unverifiable paper 
credentials, and a demeanor consistent with a military officer. These characteristics 
allowed the impostor to pass a brief security inspection and work within a ‘secured’ site 
for several days. This incident, although a rare but serious example, highlights the limits 
of current methods for identifying response personnel. The infiltration of the Flight 800 
response and recovery operation evidences only one of several dimensions of a 
comprehensive identity management capability gap for response and recovery 
operations that can be traced through an examination of historical terrorism incident 
response in the United States. 
The current identity management system for first responders has left a nation-wide 
capability gap. The decentralized system has resulted in as many different forms of first 
responder identification as there are federal agencies and state and local governments. 
The lack of standardization and interoperability among forms of identification is 
problematic when confronting a large-scale, multi-jurisdictional response to a suspected 
incident of terrorism. In addition to the response to the crash of TWA Flight 800, this 
lack of capability is documented in the after-action reports of the response to every 
major domestic incident of terrorism, specifically the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and 
the 9/11 responses to both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This article seeks 
to define the scope of the problem, identify the elements of a potential solution, and 
briefly evaluate two alternative approaches to solving the problem. First, the failures of 
identity management through the response to previous incidents of terrorism and other 
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catastrophic incidents will be traced. Once cataloged, these ‘failures’ form the necessary 
framework for potential solutions to the problem. Finally, two alternative approaches to 
the problem will be evaluated for potential to improve identity management for 
terrorism incident response. 
As will be revealed, the problem of identity management for terrorism incident 
response is multi-faceted. There are two main elements that contribute to the problem.  
The first element is related to the definition of identity presented in the second 
paragraph and introduced through the opening vignette – identity authentication. 
Identity authentication essentially answers two questions: first, simply, “who is this?” 
and second, “how certain are we that a person is who they say they are?” The second 
element is related to a second part of the definition of identity.  Identity is also defined 
as “the set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is 
recognizable as a member of a group.”3 Group identity as it relates to terrorism incident 
response is essentially the training credential of an individual. This aspect of identity 
answers the question “what tasks is this individual trained to perform?” 
Although the two elements of identity can be studied separately, for the purpose of 
this article they are examined together. The elements are bundled because successful 
terrorism incident response is dependent upon both aspects of identity. The purpose of 
this article is to begin the discussion of identity management for terrorism incident 
response; it is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the two elements of identity. 
The article is intended to examine the scope of the problem, frame the elements of 
potential solutions, and identify areas for additional research. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM TERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE 
The identity management capability gap for terrorism incident response is a pervasive 
but solvable problem. The post-9/11 focus on the development of capabilities related to 
incident response, including acquisition of CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, Explosive) detection equipment, response apparatus, and personal protective 
equipment have left out the essential component of identity management. Despite the 
glaring lack of capability, it has been all but ignored in homeland security preparedness 
efforts targeted at first response personnel. 
Discussion of identity management is also hampered by the absence of an extensive 
body of knowledge or current debate on the issue. This section begins to address this 
shortcoming by examining the question: Is first responder identity management really a 
problem? Current accessible information bulletins and the After-Action Reports (AAR) 
of the response to domestic incidents of terrorism will be examined to develop the 
answer to this essential question. 
The problem of identity management for terrorism incident response begins prior to 
the TWA Flight 800 disaster and has several dimensions beyond simple authentication 
of personal identity. The problem was identified in the response to the nation’s first 
major domestic terrorist incident requiring a large multi-jurisdictional response: the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. On April 19, 1995, 
Timothy McVeigh detonated 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil 
loaded in a Ryder box truck outside the Murrah Federal building. The blast caused a 
catastrophic collapse of the building, resulting in the deaths of 168 people and injuries 
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to 500 others. The ensuing public safety response and recovery efforts revealed major 
gaps in identity management capabilities at all levels of government. 
Within two hours of the blast, the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) had 
established a controlled perimeter around the incident site.4 Identification of personnel 
immediately became an issue. Initially, the OCPD moved its permit and identification 
section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges. The operation lasted only 
a few hours as supplies were quickly exhausted.5 The OCPD continued to issue 
alternative forms of identification. Due to rain and lighting, the location of the identity 
station changed three times. When agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) arrived, they also began issuing identification, causing confusion for those 
manning the perimeter. FBI and OCPD finally consolidated their operations and issued 
one form of identification, operating from a vacant warehouse building. The building 
was large enough to hold the up to 100 people who were waiting for identification after 
filling out permit forms and completing necessary identification checks.  The combined 
identification operation issued approximately twenty thousand passes over a seventeen-
day period.6 In the publication Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned 
for Other Communities, an unnamed Oklahoma City law enforcement officer claimed: 
“Over 28,000 identity badges were issued during the Oklahoma City response and 
recovery effort. It took days to establish a central issuing agency. A predetermined ID 
system would have greatly reduced ID chaos.”7 Included among the lessons learned in 
the document is the important recommendation to “establish a Site ID 
System…Controlling access to the site is an immediate and on-going need.”8 
The need for a comprehensive identity management solution was also evident in the 
9/11 response to the Pentagon. Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an 
identification system for incident scene security and accountability. The system 
consisted of 2,000 colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene. In the 
tremendous public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington 
County deployed its identity management system two days into the response. Once the 
system was utilized, the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.9 
The on-scene identity management efforts that followed included a system that took 
up to two hours to process and provide credentials to relief crews for entry into the site 
because of limited computers and lack of a central database.10 The lack of a 
comprehensive identity management system also led one Arlington County firefighter to 
observe, “A volunteer firefighter tee shirt was the only required identification.”11 At the 
request of the incident commander, the United States Secret Service instituted a more 
efficient credentialing system several days into the response. 
The identity management recommendations from the Pentagon AAR are similar to 
the lessons learned first reported in the Oklahoma City AAR. The Pentagon AAR 
concluded, “Arlington County should work with…emergency response and volunteer 
organizations to implement a uniform identification system. Such a system should be in 
place and used routinely.”12 These incidents indicate the need for a comprehensive 
identity management system that delivers the necessary capabilities to support incident 
response operations. 
The September 11, 2001 response to the World Trade Center terrorist attacks is not 
documented by an official after-action report and, as a result, there is limited 
documented information concerning identity management at the incident scene. The 
LANDAHL, IDENTITY CRISIS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
4 
 
McKinsey & Co. report prepared for the New York City Police Department, entitled 
Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, does provide some 
information regarding the problems associated with identity management on the WTC 
incident scene. 
The report asserts that it took several days to secure the perimeter. It also details the 
problems caused by this delay. The report states that “due to inconsistent control of 
access and absence of an effective credentialing system, perimeter security [was] not 
adequately established, allowing large numbers of unnecessary personnel to enter 
site.”13 Although the report does not contain a sanctioned set of recommendations or 
lessons learned, the challenges faced during the response and recovery operation can be 
discerned from the content of the report. Based on the report, perimeter security and 
identity management proved to be significant challenges without an effective solution. 
The previous sections identify many of the gaps associated with past responses to 
domestic terrorism incidents. Knowing identity management is a problem, in the past 
and in the future, but avoiding steps to solve the problem, would once again 
demonstrate that the nation suffers from a “failure of imagination” as described in the 
9/11 Commission Report.14 If we reasonably know what is possible, it should be included 
in our planning and preparation. 
The vignette in the introduction of this article revealed the opportunity to exploit 
current identity documents for secure site infiltration. This security gap could be 
exploited to perpetrate a secondary attack.  Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness 
and Response points out that the “risk of secondary attack was not made a priority.”15 
The possibility of secondary attacks at incident scenes such as the WTC response must 
be considered. The May 2005 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin identifies the 
two components of a secondary attack as follows: “The first one draws in emergency 
responders, regardless of the extent of deaths and injuries. In the second, the 
responders themselves become the target and include not only law enforcement, fire 
and rescue, and emergency medical personnel but civilian Good Samaritans as well.”16 
The exploitation of lax identity procedures to perpetrate a secondary attack is a 
plausible conclusion based on pervasive failures in previous incident response. The 
potential utilization of this gap for terrorist activity is also advanced by the Department 
of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation joint bulletin released in 
December 2004 titled Potential Terrorist Use of Public Safety or Service Industry 
Uniforms, Identification, or Vehicles.17 The bulletin warns of the potential exploitation 
of the unverifiable identity characteristics of the public safety and service industry 
(uniforms, paper identification, vehicles, etc.) for terrorist activity. Possible scenarios 
include the use of public safety and service industry uniforms or vehicles to perpetrate a 
secondary attack on first responders. The exploitation of these unverifiable identity 
characteristics could allow access to critical sites, such as staging areas, where a 
secondary attack would prevent rescue efforts and potentially cause mass casualties to 
first responders. Although a secondary attack can also come from a pre-placed device, 
the possibility exists for an attack precipitated by infiltration through the unverifiable 
flash identification, uniform, and vehicle paradigm. 
The after-action and related reports detailing the response to the three major 
domestic terrorist attacks reveal a common problem that to date has not been effectively 
resolved. The common element among the lessons learned from the responses to each 
incident reveals that identity management failure is endemic to terrorism incident 
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response. From Oklahoma City to Arlington to New York City, identity management is a 
glaring response capability gap. Despite AAR recommendations regarding 
improvements needed in identity management dating back to 1995, little has been 
accomplished in the recognition and development of a solution. Identity management is 
not simply a local, state, or regional problem, but a national problem that has been 
largely ignored. 
ELEMENTS OF AN IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTION 
The previous section served to define the scope of the identity management problem for 
incident response. In this section these common identity management failures are 
organized and explained as the elements of a potential solution. These elements are 
derived from the analysis of the response to previous incidents of terrorism and the 
consideration of future incident scenarios. In the paragraphs that follow the four 
elements of a potential identity management solution are defined. 
1. Identity Authentication 
In Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat, the key to identity 
authentication is described as “access to data to assist in the validation, verification, and 
authentication of personal identifiers.”18 Validation of the data is predicated on trust.  
The heart of identity management lies in the creation and maintenance of trust. Trust 
allows for a consumer to have a defined level of certainty in the authenticity of a 
credential based on the process by which it was issued and the security of the token.  
The trust model provides a level of certainty for the consumer in answer to the question, 
“Who is this?” Certainty and trust are measured through a two-pronged test of product 
and process. 
In order to provide certainty and trust in an identity credential, it must be sound in 
both product and process. The process must provide assurances that an individual has 
been vetted through an identity-proofing process. The process should include common 
criteria and assurances prior to enrollment and token issuance. The more stringent the 
criteria and assurances are, the higher the level of certainty and trust. Strong criteria 
may include elements such as background investigations, collection and verification of 
biometric information, and requirements for presentation of certain identity documents 
prior to issuance. 
The second prong of the test is the product, or identity token (document, card, or 
item that is used to establish identity) itself. Trust and certainty are developed through a 
product that is counterfeit resistant. The ability of the product to resist change and/or 
duplication develops certainty and trust. The stronger the product is to resist 
counterfeit, the higher the level of trust and certainty in the answer to the question, 
“Who is this?” 
Process and product come together to form a trust model. Both aspects must be 
sound to develop certainty. A stringent vetting process backed with a token that can be 
easily reproduced and altered does not create trust. Likewise an identity token that is 
strongly resistant to tampering, but was issued without criteria or assurances, also 
creates uncertainty and is not trusted. Identity authentication is marrying sound process 
and a tamper-resistant product to create certainty and trust. 
President Ronald Reagan often quoted the Russian proverb “doveryai no proveryai,” 
which translates to “trust, but verify,” to describe his foreign policy dealings with the 
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Soviet Union in the late 1980s.19 “Trust, but verify” is an appropriate mantra for first 
responder identity. The solution requires a framework that can provide verification.  
The infiltration of the response to the TWA Flight 800 disaster illustrated the 
vulnerability and limitation of trust in our current identity schema. Our visual (uniform, 
paper credential, vehicle) and behavior (acting in conformance with identified office) 
based identity management system must be replaced with identity authentication 
through verifiable credentials. If the TWA disaster had been a terrorist attack, the 
current system would not have mitigated the threat of secondary attack against first 
responders. 
2. Rapid In-Processing 
In-processing for incident response requires that identity and affiliation be verified, the 
responder be enrolled or logged into the scene, the level of site access determined, and 
accountability be maintained by tracking personnel on-scene. Rapid in-processing for 
identity management is the ability to perform these tasks efficiently with minimal 
impact on the completion of tactical objectives for incident response. The lack of rapid 
in-processing to incident scenes is documented as a failing of identity management for 
terrorism incident response. The AAR’s for both the Oklahoma City and Pentagon 
responses indicate that it took hours to provide credentials to personnel for entry into 
the scenes. Speed of processing, however, competes with identity authentication in an 
incident response setting. Perimeter personnel must weigh security against the 
immediate need for personnel at an incident scene. Due to the inadequacies of the 
current identity management system, perimeter personnel are forced to revert to 
unverifiable credentials and the uniform, emergency vehicle, and demeanor consistent 
with the identity construct. Any identity management solution must provide a level of 
security and speed that does not hinder, but enhances, incident response. The speed of 
processing should be consistent with the time required for perimeter personnel to check 
“flash” identification and ask follow-up questions. 
3. Interoperability 
The Department of Homeland Security SAFECOM program defines interoperability as 
“the ability of emergency responders to work seamlessly with other systems or products 
without any special effort.”20 An identity solution for terrorism incident response must 
have this important capability. The problems of radio interoperability are well 
documented. They are found among the lessons learned of every AAR and became a 
central focus of the 9/11 Commission Report. The same gaps would be found if 
technology had been broadly applied to identity management for first responders. The 
implementation of identity management technology for first responders is in its infancy.  
In its current state, it is the communication equivalent of smoke signals. This can be 
seen as a problem or an opportunity. Unlike communications, there is not a 
proliferation of proprietary technology that has been implemented for identity 
management. This presents an opportunity to create a standards-based interoperable 
system. Interoperability is a necessary element in authentication of responders from 
varied disciplines and levels of government who converge on incident scenes. 
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4. Data Storage / Retrieval and Promulgation Capability 
Data storage/retrieval and promulgation is the ability to store or link to data in a 
manner that it can be brought forward for utilization in other processes. An identity 
management system for improved terrorism incident response must include the 
capability to store or link data in a manner that can be distributed to and utilized by 
incident commanders.  Data storage/retrieval and promulgation addresses two aspects 
deficient in previous response to incidents of terrorism. The first deficit involves the 
matter of the training credential.   
The group affiliation, or training credential in this case, is essential information for 
incident commanders to adequately deploy and coordinate appropriate assets to achieve 
incident objectives. In Information, Technology, and Coordination: Lessons from the 
World Trade Center Response, the importance of information for deployment and 
coordination of responders is highlighted: “Effective deployment and coordination 
depend on many kinds of information from the roles and capabilities of response and 
support organizations to the identity of individual responders.”21 While the effective 
utilization of assets is a problem of incident management, providing the information 
concerning the characteristics, group affiliation, or training credential of assets is a 
function of identity management. 
The second deficiency in terrorism incident response that can be addressed through 
data storage/ retrieval and promulgation is accountability. In the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Staff Statement No. 14, the following 
outlines the deficiency in accountability: “Once units arrived at the WTC they were not 
accounted for comprehensively and coordinated.”22 Providing this information is a 
function of a comprehensive identity management system. Would the resources have 
been uncoordinated and unaccounted had an effective identity management system 
been in place? A properly structured and effective identity management system would 
provide real-time usable information to incident commanders concerning the number, 
location, and qualifications of assets at his/her disposal. With regards to personnel 
resources, the answers to questions such as: “Who is this?” and “What can they do for 
me?” are critical to incident commanders. An effective identity management system for 
incident response must provide incident commanders with the data to answer those 
critical questions. 
TWO APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION: INCIDENT RESPONSE RESOURCE 
OR COMPREHENSIVE NATIONWIDE PROGRAM 
The previous sections detail the problem of identity management for terrorism incident 
response as pervasive, but not without potential solution. The framework revealed by 
the analysis of the After-Action Reports of domestic incidents of terrorism identifies the 
elements of an identity management solution necessary to improve incident response.  
These elements can be achieved through two possible options: the on-scene resource or 
a nationwide comprehensive identity solution for first responders. In the following 
sections the two options will be developed and examined for their potential application 
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DEFINING AN INCIDENT RESPONSE RESOURCE: THE IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT TEAM 
The concept of identity management teams for incident response is not novel. A version 
of this solution has been implemented at every major incident of terrorism out of 
necessity, utilizing available materials and untrained personnel and resulting in 
repeated and unnecessary mistakes. The need to control access and positively identify 
personnel on terrorism incident scenes was recognized with our first domestic attack on 
the World Trade Center in 1993. The impetus in 1993 was the need to control access to 
the crime scene.23  The additional threat of secondary attack, as described previously in 
this article, increases the urgency for implementing effective incident scene control and 
credentialing. The failings of identity credentialing during the 1995 Oklahoma City 
Murrah Federal Building bombing, and the 2001 responses to the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, were pervasive and discussed earlier to illustrate and define the 
problem of identity management for terrorism incident response. In this section the 
Arlington County and Oklahoma City After-Action Reports will be revisited in greater 
detail. They are instructive because the failings of identity management early in the 
incidents were tempered with later success. The systems that were instituted over the 
course of the incidents, through trial and error, provide best practices and a concept of 
operations at the heart of what should comprise an on-scene identity management team 
for terrorism incident response.   
As established through the previous analysis of historical responses to incidents of 
terrorism, identity management is deficient for terrorism incident response. Despite this 
deficiency, there is currently no defined response asset under the FEMA National 
Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative to address this important function. 
The National Mutual Aid Resource Management Initiative “supports the National 
Incident Management System by establishing a comprehensive, integrated, national 
mutual aid and resource management system that provides the basis to type, order, and 
track all (federal, state, and local) response assets.”24 The resource definitions are typed 
so the level of capability of resources can be readily determined before an asset is 
requested. The problem is that there is no resource definition that performs the function 
of identity management for incident response.  Currently, if an incident commander 
needed assistance in managing access to the scene through a credentialing system, there 
are no typed assets to order through mutual aid or other process to perform this 
function, forcing ad-hoc solutions. The intent of this section is twofold: first, to develop 
a typed resource definition based on lessons learned from two selected case studies of 
previous incident response; second, to evaluate the definition across the previously 
developed framework for improved terrorism incident response. 
Identity Management Team Case Studies 
The development of the resource definition for identity management begins with the 
examination of the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing and the 2001 
response to the attack on the Pentagon. These incidents and after-action reports provide 
significant detail regarding the development of ad-hoc identity management capabilities 
as the incidents unfolded. Parallels will be drawn utilizing other published documents 
that highlight identity management efforts but do not provide enough significant detail 
for a case study. An analysis of these incidents reveals a baseline structure to construct a 
typed identity management resource. 
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1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building Bombing 
In the response to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing incident many lessons were learned 
concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, importance of site access 
control, and the need for dedicated identity management resources. The Oklahoma City 
incident provides the background for the first large-scale terrorist incident that required 
a robust capability for identity management and scene control. Through trial and error, 
and utilizing only available resources, an ad-hoc identity management capability was 
developed and sustained that allowed for the issuance of over 28,000 identity 
credentials over the course of the incident. 
The initial failure of identity management at the incident scene was due to the lack of 
any pre-planned credentialing option. This lesson learned is captured in the 
recommendations of the after-action report. Although the capability gap is clearly 
identified in the report, eleven years later there still remains no guidance or nationally 
defined resource to perform this critical function. This subsection seeks to close the gap 
first exposed in the Oklahoma City response by defining a response asset for this critical 
function.   
The development of on-scene identity credentialing first requires the establishment 
of a perimeter. In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, establishing a controlled 
perimeter around the incident site occurred within two hours of the blast.25 Once the 
perimeter was established the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) utilized its 
only available asset to issue identification by moving its Permit and Identification 
Section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges. The Permit and 
Identification Section was not a deployable asset; however, it was the only available 
option for credentialing. Once established, the operations of the Permits and 
Identification Section lasted only a few hours as identity supplies were quickly 
exhausted.26 
The OCPD continued to issue alternative forms of identification: “different colored 
passes were issued for each day after April 20th to discourage people from returning to 
the site when they had no current assignment.”27 Due to rain and lighting conditions, 
the location of the identity station changed three times. When agents from the FBI 
arrived, they also began issuing identification, causing confusion for those manning the 
perimeter. The FBI and OCPD finally consolidated their operations and issued one form 
of identification, operating from a vacant warehouse building. This is an important 
concept of operation in the employment of an identity management resource: it must be 
integrated and maintain a permanent location throughout the incident. 
In Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned for Other Communities, it 
is reported that early in the response “the ID process was a major issue due to lack of 
controls and systems in place. No one had been designated to issue ID's and the system 
was hit and miss.”28 This is instructive in defining an identity asset as it must include 
controls and systems, and be specifically designated to perform the function with a 
direct link to on-scene unified command.  
The after-action report also details the process utilized for credentialing volunteers 
and rescue workers. 
The process was as follows: volunteers appeared at the Permits and ID location 
and filled out a permit form with their name, agency, and destination. This permit 
form was submitted along with a photo ID. The Investigator would inquire as to 
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reasons for accessing the scene. The permit would be approved or denied based on 
the reason and destination. The Investigator entered the information into a 
logbook, signed the permit, and sent the volunteer to the FBI photo section for 
their photo ID. If there were questions about the admittance of a person, the FBI 
made the final determination.29 
The excerpt from the after-action report gives detail on the process for issuing on-scene 
identity credential documents. This process included examination of identity 
documents, affiliation and destination, collection of a photograph, and recording of the 
issued document.  These elements form the basis of a minimum inspection necessary for 
entrance to a terrorism incident scene. Another essential element of the identity 
management function is communications equipment. Credentialing staff utilized “a 
cellular phone and a police radio…when trying to check on whether a volunteer should 
gain access to the scene.”30 Communications equipment and the aforementioned direct 
contact with on-scene incident command are essential elements in a response asset for 
identity management. 
The process was not without criticism. “Due to the number of persons requesting 
entry, the limited resources for processing permits, and lack of guidelines, this process 
generated complaints. Complaints came from rescue workers and volunteers about the 
length of time to obtain a permit and the restrictions on the permit.”31 The identity 
process undertaken during the Murrah Federal Building bomb response was completed 
by hand, not utilizing computerized processes. The after-action report advises “The 
entire process would probably have gone more smoothly had investigators been able to 
utilize lap top computers to enter the necessary data on the volunteers.”32 The defined 
response resource must include computerized processes that allow data and biometric 
information to be quickly captured and stored to allow access at later times to facilitate 
processing for re-entry into the scene. 
The Oklahoma City bombing response provides baseline information on the 
development of a defined resource to improve identity management for terrorism 
incident response. The lessons learned from that response suggest seven elements for 
the concept of operations and necessary equipment for an identity management asset 
for incident response. The elements related to the concept of operations of a defined 
resource include a pre-planned solution, an established perimeter, a defined location for 
distribution, and systems and controls (including a defined issuance process and 
tracking of issued credentials). The lessons learned also revealed the equipment and 
identity supplies needed for identity management: mechanisms for receiving 
replenishment, communications equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and 
database access), and computer equipment for identity document production (digital 
cameras, computers, identification printers). The lessons learned from, and ad hoc 
developments during, the response to the Oklahoma City bombing form the basis of a 
defined resource for identity management for incident response. 
2001 Pentagon Response 
The response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 also offers 
many lessons learned concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, 
importance of site access control, and the need for dedicated identity management 
resources. The Pentagon attack provides additional background for large-scale terrorist 
incident response that requires a robust capability for identity management and scene 
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control. As with the Oklahoma City bombing, credentialing at the Pentagon developed 
through trial and error, utilizing available resources. The Pentagon response also tested 
the boundaries of a limited credentialing solution developed by the Arlington County 
Police Department in the wake of the identity failures in the Oklahoma City response. 
The development of the credentialing function at the Pentagon incident site is also 
instructive as its evolution informs the development of a resource definition for an 
identity management team for improved terrorism incident response. 
Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 
Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an identification system for incident 
scene security and accountability. The system consisted of 2,000 red, yellow, blue, and 
green colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene. In the tremendous 
public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington County deployed 
its identity management system two days into the response. Once the system was 
utilized, the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.33 This failure is 
instructive in that it took two days to implement an access control system and 
demonstrated that identity supplies must be significant to support issuance to 
thousands of responders. This critical failure further enhances the argument that a 
defined deployable identity management resource, staffed by trained personnel who 
possess the appropriate equipment and supplies, is essential for improved terrorism 
incident response. 
On the third day of the response, the Defense Protective Service (DPS), using a tactic 
similar to that employed by Oklahoma City Police in 1995, utilized its available badging 
equipment to produce identity credentials. The DPS system is described in the after-
action report as “burdensome”34 and “inadequate for a task of this magnitude.”35    In 
addition, the badging process “took too long, delaying shift changes inordinately.”36 The 
AAR also claims that “because of the limited computers to create badges and lack of a 
single database, processing added an additional burden to crew relief.”37 A defined 
identity management resource must have adequate computer stations and utilize a 
single database. This also emphasizes the need for a defined asset. Ad-hoc solutions 
waste valuable time as lessons are learned in identity management for incident response 
time and again, at the cost of safety, force protection, and lost on-scene work hours. 
At the request of DPS and the FBI, the identity system was bolstered by the addition 
of United States Secret Service (USSS) identity assets. The AAR describes that the USSS 
trained members of the Army Band to operate its five portable badge-making 
workstations.38 After the incorporation of the USSS equipment the system was 
described as “effective.”39 The addition of more appropriate equipment and trained 
personnel resulted in a system that was more effective. This is instructive in the 
development of a defined resource, as the number of workstations must permit 
sufficient throughput not to hamper on-scene operations. 
The 9/11 Pentagon response provides further validation of the baseline information 
provided by the study of the Oklahoma City bombing for the development of a defined 
resource to improve identity management for terrorism incident response. In addition 
to the lessons learned from the response to the Oklahoma City incident, the Pentagon 
response provides information for the construction of a defined identity management 
resource. Lessons learned indicate the need for adequate supplies, sufficient 
workstations to provide reasonable throughput, and the need for a central database. 
These additional factors, when combined with the elements revealed in the response to 
LANDAHL, IDENTITY CRISIS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
12 
 
the Oklahoma City incident, provide the baseline for a defined resource for identity 
management functions on incident scenes. 
Identity Management Team Typed Resource 
The lessons learned and basic necessary elements of an identity management team were 
revealed through examination of the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building 
bombing and the 2001 response to the Pentagon. The elements related to the concept of 
operations of a defined asset include a pre-planned solution, an established perimeter, a 
defined distribution location, a direct link to on-scene incident command, and systems 
and controls (including a consistent issuance process and tracking of issued 
credentials). The lessons learned also revealed necessary equipment, including: a 
significant amount of identity supplies and mechanisms to acquire additional materials, 
communications equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and database access), 
computer equipment sufficient for significant throughput for identity document 
production (digital cameras, computers, identification printers), and a single centralized 
database. The following resource definition (Table 1) and concept of operations (Figure 
1) were developed utilizing these lessons learned and basic elements, 
 
RESOURCE: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM (IDMT) 




TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV OTHER 
Equipment Computer 
Equipment 
5 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(5 Computers, 5 Digital 
Cameras, 5 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 
3 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(3 Computers, 3 Digital 
Cameras, 3 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 






radios, extra batteries, 





radios, extra batteries, 
battery charger, cellular 
phones) 




Access, external LE 
database access 
Wireless Internet 
Access, external LE 
database access 
   
Equipment Software Database accessible by 
Incident Command 
Database accessible by 
Incident Command 












Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
5,000 interoperable 
Identity Tokens 
Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
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RESOURCE: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM (IDMT) 




TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV OTHER 
Equipment Generator Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
   
Personnel Training Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment and 
perform identity 
functions 
Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment 
and perform identity 
functions 
   




1 Supervisor or OIC 
4 Officers 
   
Vehicles  Integrated in mobile 
asset or deployable to a 
fixed location 
Integrated in Mobile 
Asset / or deployable to 
fixed location 
   
COMMENTS: Type I – A pre-designated team consisting of one OIC, one supervisor and six officers in an integrated mobile 
response asset. The team has the ability to manage identity management functions for large-scale incidents. The 
team engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
Type II – A pre-designated team consisting of one supervisor or OIC and four  officers in an integrated mobile 
response unit or deployable to a fixed location.  The team has the ability to manage identity functions for small to 
mid-sized events. Team engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
TABLE 1:  IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM RESOURCE DEFINITION 
 
The function of the IDMT is to provide identity authentication and accountability 
support to incident command through the implementation of a comprehensive on-scene 
credentialing system. The IDMT function is dependent upon the establishment of a 
strong perimeter, as evidenced by the analysis of the Oklahoma City and Pentagon 
Incidents. The concept of operations also must include deferment of un-requested assets 
to a secondary staging area. The FEMA report Responding to Incidents of National 
Consequence: Recommendations for America’s Fire and Emergency Services Based on 
The Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents recommends “There 
should be a separate marshalling area at the incident base for unrequested/unverified 
resources. This ‘corral’ concept was used in Oklahoma City. For added security, law 
enforcement should manage the perimeter of these areas.”40 This recommendation is 
incorporated into the IDMT concept of operations outlined in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1:  IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
The study of the Oklahoma City bombing and the Pentagon attack also revealed the 
need for a consistent system of identity issuance. The Oklahoma City AAR detailed the 
process that was utilized to issue credentials; however, the Pentagon AAR does not 
provide sufficient detail that describes the mechanisms of the issuance process. The 
paper-based system that was developed out of necessity and availability of materials can 
be greatly enhanced with the advent of readily available technologies that can transfer 
data from existing identity credentials, such as readers for 2D barcodes or magnetic 
stripes that have been incorporated into many state drivers’ licenses. In addition, the 
need to maintain connectivity to law enforcement and other databases allows for further 
inspection of identity as outlined in the resource definition (Table 1). This allows for 
verification of identity through other sources, should inspection and electronic 
implementation of available credentials require additional investigation. 
Utilizing exploitable features of existing identity credentials, coupled with agency 
issued credentials, can greatly enhance the ability to examine documents and rapidly 
populate data into a database for a smooth and rapid process for credential issuance. In 
some jurisdictions it may also be possible to pre-populate the database with responder 
information/ biometrics that can be utilized in emergency response situations requiring 
tight scene controls. Individual jurisdictions or regions may choose to issue responder 
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credentials with exploitable technology that can further improve the on-scene 
credentialing process. 
The Department of Defense program Defense Cross Credentialing Identification 
System (DCCIS) has developed a web-base option for identity verification for non-
government personnel requiring access to government resources.41 The Federation for 
Identity and Cross-Credentialing Systems (FiXS) maintains the ability to authenticate 
identity through the maintenance of a system that allows companies to keep their 
employee data in their own system that is only accessed when a credential is presented 
for authentication. The structure of the system alleviates privacy concerns as data is not 
maintained in a single accessible database. This model is not a strong option for 
applicability to identity management for incident response; communications have 
traditionally failed during response to incidents of terrorism. The dependence on a web-
based system would require assurances of continued access throughout the evolution of 
an event. This is not a dependable option based on previous response experience. 
The implementation of an interoperable or technology-based solution at the local or 
state level will continue to require a dedicated resource to manage identity. A 
technological solution does not eliminate the need for the function to be managed and 
maintained on-scene. In addition, not all responders will be issued the same credential, 
particularly across private-sector agencies that are critical to the success of response and 
recovery operations. Those not issued credentials pre-event will require the on-scene 
identity issuance capability of a defined identity management team. 
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONWIDE IDENTITY SOLUTION FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS 
It would be reasonable to believe that the identity management problem – detailed in 
the after-action reports on every major incident of domestic terrorism – must have been 
resolved, considering the many reports of the many panels and commissions 
investigating terrorism response following 9/11. This is not the case. Although the gap 
has been identified and documented, these reports barely make mention of it. An 
implementable solution to the identity management gap for terrorism incident response 
has been mentioned in the reports, but is not included by any panel among its final 
recommendations. The following represents a summary of the identify management 
concepts outlined in post-9/11 homeland security reports. Many of the suggested 
solutions are limited to technological possibilities such as biometric identifiers, bar-
codes, RFID, and smart cards, but fall short of providing concrete implementable 
solutions. 
The concept of addressing identity through a comprehensive enterprise solution first 
appeared as a “standardized emergency responder identification and accounting 
system” to be coordinated by FEMA. This was first proposed in the National Emergency 
Management Association’s October 2001 White Paper on Domestic Preparedness.42 The 
explanation was limited to a bulleted point that provided no suggestion for the scope or 
methodology of the program. A “universal identification card” for positive identification 
of response personnel also appeared as an “area for future research and analysis, and 
subsequent conclusions and policy recommendations” in the third report of the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) published in December 2001.43 
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The explanation was also limited to a bulleted point that did not provide further 
description of the proposed program.  
In the fourth Gilmore Commission report a “nation-wide law enforcement/first 
responder identification system” is proposed as a solution to the problem of inadequate 
authentication of identities for personnel operating systems and working in critical 
facilities.44 In addition, the report suggests that “smart card” technology be included in a 
system that “must be able to be effectively used during mutual aid operations and other 
cooperative efforts between different levels of government and between different 
government entities at the same governmental level.”45 The proposed identity system 
solution is located in an appendix to the document and is not listed among the key 
recommendations of the panel. The placement in an appendix, lack of substantive 
explanation, and relative unimportance given to this solution in the report is perplexing. 
Additionally, the nexus between a system for the identification of law enforcement/first 
responders and the stated problem of authentication of the identity of personnel 
operating systems and working in critical facilities is unclear. This solution, identified in 
“Appendix L: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks” of the fourth 
Gilmore Commission, serves as a critical response capability, and should have been 
further developed and included among the key recommendations of the panel. 
The necessity for standardized response identification is also cited in the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Universal Task List (UTL). The UTL is one component of 
the DHS planning “tool-box” for its capabilities-based preparedness planning process. 
The UTL is a comprehensive list of seventeen hundred tasks and sub-tasks required to 
respond to the fifteen event scenarios outlined in the national planning scenarios. The 
UTL common task: Communication and Information Management contains the task 
“Establish role of operation area satellite system (OASIS) at the EOC.”46 As a sub-task 
“Establish a national authentication and security identification certification system for 
emergency responders, Federal, State, local and tribal personnel and other non-
government personnel requiring access to affected areas” is listed.47 The placement of 
the identity management concept is once again perplexing as it is listed as a sub-task to 
a disconnected overarching task regarding satellite systems. There is a pattern in the 
development of the first responder identity concept: although considered critical, it has 
been obscured under irrelevant and unrelated tasks and objectives. The importance of 
the concept warrants its direct recognition and inclusion as an overarching task. 
The UTL serves to inform the companion planning document in the capabilities 
based planning process the Target Capabilities List (TCL).48 The TCL is comprised of 
those three hundred tasks listed in the UTL that are deemed “critical” and grouped into 
thirty-six target capabilities.49 The identified sub-task concerning emergency responder 
identification certification was not included among the three hundred UTL tasks that 
were deemed as critical and migrated into thirty-six critical capabilities in the TCL. The 
need for identity management at incident scenes is an essential response capability, a 
documented capability gap, and should be included as target capabilities, or at a 
minimum to be included as a sub-task.50   
The identity management for first responder concept is also included in the RAND 
Corporation publication Protecting Emergency Responders Volume 3: Safety 
Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response. The publication outlines the 
recommendation to “develop personnel identification and credentialing systems better 
suited to major disaster response operations.”51 The document outlines several options 
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for achievement of the recommendation. Traditional solutions including color-coded 
event badges, armbands, and/or vests as identification are recognized as deficient 
because they offer only visual recognition and do not provide additional capabilities for 
accountability and training credentials.52 Any identification and credentialing system 
must be part of pre-event preparedness and should include “their certifications, training 
levels, and other information on their general skills relevant to operating in a hazardous 
environment.”53 Technology options to achieve the recommendation include smart 
cards, bar-code identifiers, RFID, and biometric systems. The report contains the most 
comprehensive explanation of any of the listed programs; however, it falls short of 
providing a specific framework for implementation. 
The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, in Project 
Responder: National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic 
Terrorism, proposes a responder identity solution related to training and credentialing. 
The report calls for “a digital smart card/chip ‘electronic transcript’ system that securely 
verifies identification, levels of training/certification, and currency, for the multitude of 
responders that converge on the scene of a high-visibility CBRNE event.”54 The report 
recommends research, development, and piloting of a GPS-enabled “smart card” tested 
through multi-jurisdictional response exercises. The overarching goal is to provide the 
on-scene commander with technology that could broadcast “a rapid, accurate, and 
verifiable picture of resource and skill availability, and ensure the qualifications of each 
responder at the scene.”55 The report outlines a four-year process that includes research, 
implementation in three jurisdictions, evaluation, and standards development. While it 
seems comprehensive, the report does not provide specific information concerning 
implementation. 
The literature related to identity management for incident response shows it as a 
clear and protracted problem. The AAR reports also show a clear capability gap for 
terrorism incident response. The post-9/11 panel and commission reports present a 
limited range of solutions that neglect specifics for implementation. The challenge 
presented by incident response identity management has only been included as a 
secondary or tertiary recommendation in numerous reports, and has not been the 
primary subject of investigation or research for incident response application. The 
solutions presented in the literature include standardized or universal identification for 
first responders that may include the use of technology such as biometric identifiers, 
bar-codes, RFID, and smart cards. 
Opportunity Knocks: Federal Implementation of Smart Card Technology 
The federal government is shifting its identity paradigm under Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 
Government Employees and Contractors (HSPD-12). The goal of HSPD-12 is “to 
enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect 
personal privacy by establishing a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and 
reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and 
contractors.”56 HSPD-12 further clarifies secure and reliable identity as consisting of the 
following criteria. 
Secure and reliable forms of identification for purposes of this directive means 
identification that (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual 
employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, 
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counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated 
electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been 
established by an official accreditation process. The Standard will include 
graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, to ensure flexibility in 
selecting the appropriate level of security for each application.57 
The program being developed under HSPD-12 seeks to create a government-wide trust 
model. Ensuring that identification issued by any federal agency meets the same 
minimum standard in both process and product.   
The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), released the HSPD-12 directed government-wide standard on 
February 25, 2005. Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 201: 
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors (FIPS-201) 
outlines a two stage process to meet the listed criteria for a “secure and reliable form of 
identification.” The stated goal of FIPS-201 is “to achieve appropriate security assurance 
for multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals 
seeking physical access to federally controlled government facilities and electronic 
access to government information systems.”58 
The initial implementation stage, Personal Identity Verification One (PIV-I), includes 
the description of required processes to meet security and control mandates for identify 
proofing of individuals for issuance of federal identification cards under HSPD-12. The 
federal PIV card will only be issued by accredited agencies and will utilize a process 
consisting of three necessary components.59  First, the applicant will personally appear.  
Second, the applicant will present two forms of identity source documents as certified by 
the Office of Management and Budget60 (with at least one being issued by a state or 
federal authority) and submit to necessary biometric screening.61 Finally, the applicant 
will be screened through a National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI), Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM), or National Security community background 
investigation including fingerprint identification.62 
The second stage of implementation outlined by FIPS-201, Personal Identity 
Verification Two (PIV-II), includes the physical and technical elements to support 
interoperability aspects of HSPD-12. The federal PIV card bases identity authentication 
on a three-tiered system: the real-time comparison of biometrics (fingerprint and/or 
photographic), “something you are;” combined with the card itself, “something you 
have;” and a PIN numerical, “something you know.”63 The tiers backed by the 
distribution and identity-proofing standards outlined by PIV-I provide a secure identity 
solution that meets the requirements mandated by HSPD-12. The addition of PKI 
enabled digital certificate remote network verification architecture provides an 
additional level of security for both physical and logical access, as the status can be 
revoked without requiring the physical collection of the PIV card. 
The PIV card mandated by FIPS-201 consists of common physical characteristics and 
appearance elements with allowances for slight variation for specific agency purposes.  
In an effort to standardize, the physical make-up of the card is consistent with 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) requirements. FIPS-201 contains five slightly varied approved 
models for card fronts and three variations for the back of approved PIV cards. In 
addition to the Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) standardization aspects, the models allow 
flexibility for the inclusion of magnetic stripe and/or bar code technology for agency-
LANDAHL, IDENTITY CRISIS 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
19 
 
specific applications. Certain fields are mandated on the front of the PIV card, such as 
name, photograph, affiliation, agency, and expiration date. Required elements on the 
back of the card include card serial number and agency issuer identification 
FIPS-201 (PIV-II) also describes the technical requirements for PIV interoperability, 
with further detail provided in a series of related NIST and industry technical 
publications. There are five basic technical requirements governing the federal PIV card.  
FIPS-201 provides standardization requirements for the card ICC, a Card Holder 
Unique Identifier (CHUID), PIV Card Activation, the PIV authentication data (one 
asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate), and biometric data. FIPS-201 
requires that the PIV card contain both contact and contactless ICC interfaces. The ICC 
interfaces are mandated to be consistent with ISO/IEC and FIPS 140-2: Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules Standards which, when coupled with card 
reader standardization required by FIPS-201, achieves government-wide 
interoperability.64 
The required CHUID must include an expiration date, asymmetric signature field, 
and Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) that uniquely identifies and 
tracks each card. The CHUID must be readable from both contact and contactless 
interfaces. FIPS-201 mandates that the specific technical requirements outlined by NIST 
SP800-73: Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification for the CHUID and FASC-N be 
incorporated into PIV cards. The requirements for the asymmetric signature field must 
be encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as outlined in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force report RFC 3852 and NIST SP 800-78: Cryptographic 
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. 
The PIV card is required to include personal identification number (PIN) based 
cardholder activation. The PIN must be accepted by the card before it will activate for 
release of biometric and asymmetric key information. The PIN must meet the standards 
outlined in FIPS PUB 140-2. The inclusion of a PIN activated system allows for greater 
card security as the information is not transmitted until contact interface is successful 
and the correct PIN has been entered. 
The PIV card authentication data must, at minimum, consist of one asymmetric 
private key and a corresponding X.509 public key certificate stored on the card. 65 All 
keys are accessed only through the contact ICC interface and must not be exportable 
from the card. The card may also contain additional keys and PKI certificates based on 
specific agency needs.  The X.509 PKI certificate allows for remote network verification 
through Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and the Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) that must in routine situations be updated by agencies at least every eighteen 
hours. The inclusion of authentication data allows for the card certificate status to be 
verified through a secure remote network adding a strong layer of security. 
The final technical requirement of FIPS-201 is the inclusion of biometric data on the 
PIV card. The following biometric information is collected during the card issuance 
process: full-set of fingerprints, electronic facial image, and two electronic fingerprints.  
The full set of fingerprints is not electronically stored and is utilized only for law 
enforcement background checks. An electronic facial image is printed on the card face 
and may, but is not required to be, stored on the card. Two electronic fingerprints (right 
and left index finger) are required to be included on the card for biometric 
authentication. The technical specification mandates for collection and inclusion of 
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biometric data on the PIV card are located in NIST SP-800-76: Biometric Data 
Specification for Personal Identity Verification. 
The federal Personal Identity Verification project mandated by HSPD-12 and 
described by FIPS-201 provides the basis for a secure identity program far surpassing 
any current efforts to provide identity management solutions to government employees.  
The federal program is being implemented in two stages. Under PIV-I the process for 
identity proofing including background investigations, document requirements, and 
agency accreditation is administered. The second stage, PIV-2, outlines the technical 
and interoperability requirements for the federal smart PIV card. The reliance on 
interoperable smart card technological capabilities such as inclusion of biometric 
identifiers and encrypted PKI certificates provides identity verification at levels far 
beyond currently employed solutions (Figure 2). The PIV project and its inherent 
flexibility provide a secure identity model that could be replicated and applied to first 




FIGURE 2: PIV CARD SYSTEM COMPONENT MODEL66 
 
Local Implementation of HSPD-12 programs: The National Capital Region 
The unique multi-jurisdictional nature of the National Capital Region (NCR) has made 
it the first region to recognize the need to develop a comprehensive project to 
implement an HSPD-12/FIPS-201-based identity smart card for first response 
personnel. The NCR consists of the District of Columbia and bordering counties from 
Maryland and Virginia.  HSPD-12 has required federal agencies to implement FIPS-201; 
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implementation of the standard has not been mandated for state and local governments. 
The NCR is the first entity to attempt to replicate the federal program on the state and 
local level.  The blurred lines of federal, state, and local responsibility that are unique to 
the region make a common identity standard capable of electronic authentication a 
necessity. The multi-jurisdictional nature of incident response in the region necessitates 
a common interoperable platform to authenticate identity and affiliation across levels of 
government. The NCR project, titled the First Responder Authentication Card (FRAC), 
utilizes the standards outlined in FIPS-201 PIV-II to develop a platform capable of 
interoperability with federally issued smart identity cards. 
The NCR FRAC is based entirely on the standards outlined by FIPS-201 PIV-II. One 
of the major impediments to the implementation of a pure FIPS-201 PIV-I and PIV-II 
compliant identity card for state and local first responders is the background check 
requirement. As described in previous sections, FIPS-201 requires a fingerprint check 
and National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) for all personnel to be issued 
a federal identity credential. The heart of an identity trust model is the security of both 
the issuance process and the product (token). If the model is vulnerable to infiltration 
during the issuance process, or the finished product is subject to counterfeit, there is no 
trust and authentication will be suspect. At the state and local level the cost of 
conducting FIPS-201-compliant background investigations on all first responders would 
be exorbitant. 
In many communities only the background investigations conducted on law 
enforcement officers may meet the standard outlined by FIPS-201. The pre-employment 
identity verification procedures of other response disciplines, including fire, EMS, 
public works, public health, and clinical care, would not meet the standard. In order to 
meet PIV-I enrollment standards, additional investigation of employees would be 
required.  This raises numerous concerns ranging from personal privacy to the 
significant additional and associated costs. The NCR FRAC has addressed this problem 
by delineating levels of authentication based on the scope of enrollment procedures.  
This allows for a graduated trust model where four increasing levels of authentication 
are defined based upon the depth of procedures prior to credential issuance. It does not 
preclude agencies with minimal procedures from inclusion in the program; however, 
when the card is electronically authenticated the level of authentication is displayed 
allowing the user to determine if additional scrutiny is necessary. The graduated model 
ensures maximum participation among local governments (due to limited additional 
financial commitments) while maintaining a level of trust. 
The NCR was ground-zero on 9/11. The response to the terrorist attack on the 
Pentagon revealed a pervasive identity gap, as documented in previous sections of this 
article. In addition, the NCR also has the unique and frequent need for identity 
authentication of first responders from dozens of agencies across all levels of 
government for daily operations. The FRAC is a necessary element in the NCR for both 
daily operations and response to critical incidents such as those created by terrorist 
attacks. 
The NCR FRAC program is moving through the research and evaluation stage.  In 
February 2006, interoperability was tested through a limited enrollment and multi-
jurisdictional exercise dubbed “Winter Fox.” The interoperability and authentication 
capability was targeted by the exercise that took place in four locations including the 
Pentagon, Port of Baltimore, Virginia Department of Transportation, and Frederick 
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County, MD. The exercise sought to examine the ability to electronically validate PKI 
certificates of FIPS 201 standardized smart cards through four different back-end 
architectures. The cards used in the exercise included the NCR FRAC, Maryland FRAC, 
Transportation Security Administration Transportation Worker Identity Credential 
(TSA TWIC), and the Department of Defense Common Access Card (DoD CAC). Each of 
the identified cards is maintained through different back-end infrastructures. The 
exercise sought to test the capability to validate personnel identity across the disparate 
infrastructures. 
The exercise utilized hand-held readers that received satellite downloads of certificate 
revocation lists every twenty-four hours. The readers were utilized to read and validate 
PKI-enabled FIPS-201 smart cards. The Winter Fox exercise resulted in 285 scans of the 
smart cards with disparate back-end architectures. Of the scans, seventy-nine resulted 
in PIN verification failures.67 This means that 28% of the attempts were unable to be 
validated by the back-end architecture because of incorrect PIN entry, or more simply 
cardholder error. The 206 scans where the user did not err in PIN entry resulted in 
100% validation. This provides strong evidence of the interoperable capability of FIPS 
smart cards. The hand-held reader also has the ability to read, but not validate, 2D 
barcodes contained on most driver licenses. Several driver licenses were read, but were 
not validated as part of the exercise.   
Opportunity Knocks: Personnel Certification and Credentialing under the 
National Incident Management System 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) also describes the need for 
personnel certification and credentialing.  NIMS describes personnel certification and 
credentialing as: 
Personnel certification entails authoritatively attesting that individuals meet 
professional standards for the training, experience, and performance required for 
key incident management functions. Credentialing involves providing 
documentation that can authenticate and verify the certification and identity of 
designated incident managers and emergency responders.68 
The NIMS Integration Center (NIC) is working toward solutions for part of the identity 
management problem for incident response identified earlier in this article.  The NIC 
has formed working groups to develop standards for training, experience, and currency 
for specific positions within each response discipline. When developed, these standards 
will ensure standardization across jurisdictions and provide common terminology for 
determining personnel qualified to assist in the accomplishment of objectives on 
incident scenes. 
The program to date has fallen short on prescribing a method to verify identity. The 
lack of an identity-authentication solution to couple with training standards limits the 
effectiveness of the program. Without verification the program fails to develop trust.  
The current direction of the program is strengthening only the vetting process and fails 
to back that more stringent process with a trusted identity token. The NIC efforts to 
implement personnel certification standards, backed by an identity token than can be 
authenticated and is strongly resistant to counterfeit, would vastly improve identity 
management for terrorism incident response      
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The previous sections detail the pervasive failures of identity management in the 
response to incidents of domestic terrorism. The failures are significant and potentially 
high-consequence for future responses, but not so insurmountable nor without solution 
that they need be repeated again. The first step in solving the problem is recognition and 
comprehension of the problem. This article serves as a first step in recognizing and 
defining the problem of identity management for terrorism incident response. The 
analysis of incident after-action reports and other related documentation reveals a 
pattern of identity management failure in the response to large-scale incidents of 
terrorism that, when analyzed, provides a framework for a solution. It must be 
recognized that examining response in the past does not provide a complete solution for 
the future; the possible hazards of the future must also be considered. The consideration 
of plausible scenarios, such as the threat of secondary attack, serves to inform a 
proposed solution to potential threats in the future. 
The success or failure of the federal government and the National Capital Region in 
the implementation of HSPD-12 and the NCR FRAC will impact the future of identity 
management at the state and local level. Although the HSPD-12 program was developed 
for the purpose of security, efficiency, fraud protection, and privacy, the program could 
potentially mitigate the previous failures of terrorism incident response if broadly 
applied to the first-response community across levels of government. The exercise and 
evaluation of the NCR FRAC program is critical in determining the potential of the 
program for mitigating identity management problems endemic to the historical 
incident response to terrorism.  
Although the focus of this article was limited specifically to terrorism incident 
response, secure verifiable identity has benefits beyond this limited scope. Identity 
management for the full spectrum of the homeland security mission is in desperate need 
of attention and creative problem solving. A potential solution must incorporate the 
identity management issues of other homeland security mission areas in order for it to 
be comprehensive.69 Incident response is just one dimension of need as it relates to 
identity management for overall homeland security. A comprehensive solution can also 
bolster terrorism prevention and protection mission capabilities.   
For example, the HSPD-12/NCR FRAC smart card program can provide additional 
benefits through the ability to improve physical access control at government facilities 
nationwide. The United States General Accounting Office report Security: Breaches at 
Federal Agencies and Airports details the success of undercover agents in penetrating 
nineteen federal buildings and two commercial airports without screening, through the 
use of fraudulent law enforcement credentials. “At the 21 sites that our undercover 
agents successfully penetrated, they could have carried in weapons, listening devices, 
explosives, chemical/biological agents, devices, and/or other such items/materials.”70 
The report details another dimension of the identity management capability gap that 
can be addressed by the broad application of credentials capable of electronic 
authentication. This is possible through the implementation of PKI-enabled smart card 
technology for the protection of critical infrastructures. A comprehensive identity 
management program utilizing HSPD-12/NCR FRAC framework would prevent those 
agents or terrorists of the future from penetrating secure sites through unverifiable 
fraudulent credentials. 
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The HSPD-12/NCR FRAC program also provides the ability to improve information 
system security by incorporating card readers into computer access. Incorporated 
physical access control provides two layers of security for logical systems. The first 
hurdle for a potential assailant is entering the physical location; the computer card 
reader option provides a second level of security. An incorporated smart card option 
decreases the potential for cyber attack through on-site infiltration with this two-layer 
process. 
The FIPS-201/NCR FRAC program can also benefit other government operations.   
According to the CIO/ PKI Smart Card Project: Approach for Business Case Analysis of 
Using PKI on Smart Cards for Government-wide Applications, implementing smart 
card technology with digital forms improves efficiency because it “reduces paperwork, 
eliminates redundant data entry, and improves data accuracy as transcribing and data 
entry errors are eliminated”71 A smart card-based system implemented with e-
government initiatives creates public value and cost savings in other areas of 
government processes. The many additional benefits of the implementation of smart 
card technology can help address some of the concerns of cost relative to the public 
value it creates. 
There are several impediments to the nationwide implementation of a comprehensive 
HSPD-12/NCR FRAC model identity solution. The first impediment is problem 
recognition. This article has explored the problem of identity management for terrorism 
incident response for the purpose of increasing awareness. If the success of the NCR 
FRAC program continues, the solution will likely develop awareness about the problem 
it solves before the problem itself is broadly recognized. An NCR FRAC type program 
may appear to those unaware to be a solution searching for a problem.   
The second impediment is cost. One problem the NCR FRAC program has been 
unable to mitigate is the continuing cost of program maintenance. The program is 
dependent upon back-end infrastructure (PKI certificates) provided by private sector 
certificate authorities. Each digital certificate requires an enrollment fee and a yearly 
maintenance fee for the three-year life of the certificate. The cost of the card and digital 
certificate for the three year life of the card is approximately $125-$150.72 The 
continuing cost associated with the program is a major impediment to broad 
implementation by local governments.   
The State of Illinois provides an example for reducing the costs of private sector 
management of digital identity certificates. Illinois has established itself as a certificate 
authority to lower the long-term costs associated with management of digital identity.  
The program was originally established for financial transactions with the state, but has 
application to first responder identity. The state is currently developing a project to 
credential its first responders with PKI enabled smart cards. The Illinois example, of 
states serving as certificate authorities, could potentially drive down the continuing 
costs for broad local implementation of smart card technology for first responder 
identity.  The success or failure of implementation in Illinois could also have far-
reaching implications for first responder identity management. 
The efforts of the NIMS Integration Center (NIC) program to define personnel 
certification for incident response must be joined with efforts to provide secure 
verifiable identity. Personnel position definitions without a method for identity 
verification provide only minimal incremental improvement for incident response. The 
efforts of the NIC must be joined with interoperable identity initiatives.        
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The past failures of identity management in the response to incidents of terrorism 
must be recognized and brought to the forefront of homeland security policy and 
planning at the state and local level.  Creating a mechanism to positively answer the 
critical the questions “who is this?” and “what can they do for me?” can have benefits far 
beyond incident response to terrorism. A comprehensive solution could potentially be 
incorporated into the hardening of physical and logical facilities bolstering terrorism 
prevention and protection capabilities. The cost of continued ignorance could 
potentially be catastrophic. 
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